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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
!'Ia i utiff and Respond c nt,

v.

Case No.
10013

LCCY C. CALLISTER, Individually
and as Executrix of the Estate of
~\.lfred Cyril Callister, Deceased,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
~TATE.\IENT

OF FACTS

Omitting the various innuendos and arguments contained in appellant's statement of facts, a simple statemPnt follows. \Y e :-;hall, as did appellant, refer to
plaintiff a~ Y era, and defendant as Lucy.
Yera wa~ fonnerly the wife of Dr. Callister. She
obtained a divorce decree which awarded alimony. As
soon a~ thP diYoreP wa:-; final Dr. Callister married Lucy.
Alimony becmne delinquent. He made gifts to Lucy of
:'toek~ valued in excess of $90,000 telling her that the
transfers
wereLawmade
for for
the
purpose
removing
these
Sponsored
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stocks from his name and placing them beyond the access
of Vera. (R. 51) At the time of his death, Dr. Callister
owed Vera $11,150.00 together with accrued interest.
(R. 40)
Lucy acted as executrix of the doctor's estate. She
filed a probate inventory showing assets of $809.12. (R.
8'6) Claims were filed in the total amount of $14,874.43.
(R. 79, 80, 87) Lucy allowed and paid all claims except
Vera's by using the meager assets she had inventoried in
the estate and by advancing some funds she claimed as
her own. She rejected Vera's claim.
Vera filed an action to establish her claim against
the estate and to establish that the stock transfers were
in fraud of creditors. Lucy, while executrix, did not
disclose any information available to her tending to
show an intent by the doctor to defraud Vera as a creditor. Not only did Lucy fail to disclose any such information, she also, as executrix, denied Vera's pleading,
which alleged that the doctor intended by the transfer of
stock to hinder, delay or defraud her as a creditor.
Vera compromised her claim for $4000 because she
had little evidence to establish the doctor's fradulent
intent. (R. 52-13) A release, stipulation and judgment
of dismissal were executed and Vera's attorney closed
his file. (R. 52-25)
Six months later, Llewellyn Thomas, an attorney
for the Utah state tax commission came to Vera's attorney, while conducting an investigation regarding inheriSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tan('t' taxPH due in the doctor's estate.
(R. 5:2-21)
'rhomas asked \'t•ra·~ attorney why Vera had settled her
('!aim. HP Hhowed Vt>ra's attorney an affidavit by Lucy
a~~Prting to the tax conunission the very thing that
Luey, aH Pxecutrix, had so staunchly denied, namely,
that thP transfer of stock was made for the purpose of
defrauding the creditor Vera. (R. 51) The pertinent
part of this affidavit is

"That her husband told her that the transfers were 1nade for the purpose of removing these
stocks from his name and placing them beyond
access of his former wife, Vera Callister, to
whmn the doctor owed certain monies for arrearages in an alilnony judgment which she had
against hiln ;
•'That the doctor was very bitter about having to pay this alimony because he felt that his
for1uer wife had received more than her fair
share of the propery upon their divorce;"
This change of position, whereby the executrix later
asserted that the stocktransfer was in fraud of creditors
(and consequently was not in contemplation of death)
resulted in a tax saving of $4286.60. (R.128)
.Alter Lucy's settlement with the tax commiSSion,
she filed her final account with the probate court and
p~titioned for approval of her skillfully contrived administration and for her discharge from her fiduciary
duties. (R. 14:1) Yera obejcted thereto and brought the
present suit alleging three causes of action; first, that
Lucyby the
was
unjustly
enriehed,
seeond,
that
she should
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the stocks as constructive trustee and third, that because of concealment from the court and from Vera of
the fact that the doctor had told her that the transfers
of stock were made to defraud Vera, the release, stipulation and judgment of dismissal should be set aside and
she should be allowed to litigate her claim.
The court granted a summary judgment against Lucy
on the third cause of action because she had breached
her duties as a court official, which "came ahead of any
right she had as an heir of transferee". (R. 53) The
court said she had a duty "to the court as well as to the
creditors" to disclose facts relating to fraudulent transfers to herself, and to include such property as estate
assets. (R. 56)
ARGUME,NT
POINT I.
THE COURT MAY SET ASIDE A JUDGMENT FOR ANY
REASON JUSTIFYING RELIEF INCLUDING FRAUD UPON
THE COURT.

·Judge Ellett was understandably shocked by his
court official's playing "fast and loose" in estate matters.
He exercised his sound discretion in setting the judgment aside because of the acts of a court official, whereby she took advantage of her position, not only by
concealing information, which she had a duty to disclose,
but also by denying fraudulent intent on the part of Dr.
Callister and then later asserting such a fraudulent intent, both to her personal benefit.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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An independPnt action was c01mnenced to set the
judgment of dismissal aside under Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P.
Rule 60(b) provides, in part, that
.. rehe court may in the furtherance of justice
rPliPVP a party ... fr01n a final judgment ... for
tlw following reasons: ...
.. ( 7) Any other reason justifying relief fr01n
thP operation of the judgment ... This rule does
not limit the power of a court ... to set aside a
judg1nent for fraud upon the court ... "

Under 60(b) (7) Judge Ellett was justified in setting
thP judg1nent aside for 1nany reasons other than fraud,
including such reasons as (a) He did not want an offiet~r of the court to profit by her position at the expense
of a creditor of the estate. (b) He wanted an officer of
his court to fully disclose relevant facts to those persons
to whmn she had a duty of trust. (c) He wanted an
officer of his court to fully disclose relevant facts to
the court itself. (d) He did not want an officer of his
court to engage in sharp practice because the act of the
officer is, in fact, an act of the court, and the public in
general, and creditors of estates in particular, are entitled to expect and receive fair and iinpartial treatment
from the court and its officials in the probate of an
estate.
Likewise, Judge Ellett felt there was "fraud upon
the court." Fraud upon the court may arise when a court
official violates a duty to deal with the court with integrity
and
honesty.
Sponsored
by the S.J.
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" 'Fraud upon the court' should, ·we believe,
embrace only that species of fraud which does, or
attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud
perpetrated by officers of the court so that the
judicial machinery can not perforn1 in the usual
manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that
are presented for adjudication." 7 Moore's Federal Practice, Par. 60.33.
'The court was fully justified in setting aside the
judgment, under Rule 60(b), for fraud upon the court
or any other reason justifying relief. The bulk of the
arguments in appellant's brief are therefore inapplicable.
We discuss their arguments in the order presented
in appellant's brief.
POINT II.
THERE WAS FRAUD UPON THE PLAINTIFF.

Lucy argues that the specific intent of Dr. Callister
to defraud Vera might be proved by circumstantial evidence of the surrounding circumstances, rather than by
showing direct statements by the doctor showing his
intent. She quotes an inapplicable rule, about direct
testimony by a transferor, to the effect the transferor's
direct testimony denying his fraudulent intent might
not be worthy of belief. Here, we have neither direct
testimony (Dr. Callister is deceased) nor do we have
denial of fraudulent intent, but rather a declaration
against interest admitting the fraudulent intent.
·This is not only a declaration against interest, which
in and of itself is sufficient to be an exception to the
hearsay rule, but is an admission by Lucy's predecessor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in titlP, and a~ ~uch is binding upon Lucy, who is in
privity with him. Contrary to appellant's assertion that
Dr. Calli~ter'~ stateinent of his fraudulent intent would
not hP admissible because the statement was Inade sub~l'qtwnt to the transfer~, the general rule of law, which
has been ~l't forth in Inany Utah cases, is to the effect
that:
"When intent is a umterial ele1nent of a disputed fact, declarations of a decedent made after,
as well as before, an alleged act that indicate
the intent with which he performed the act, are
adn1issible."
20 Am. J ur. :mvidence, Par. 585 (Cun1ulative Suppl.)
Kelly t:. Bank of America Nat. T. & Sav' gs Association,
11~ Cal. App. 2d 388, 246 P2d 92, 34 ALR 2d 678. Annotation 34 ALR 2d 588. Mower v. Mower (1924) 64 Utah
:2ti0, ~28 P 911; Chamberlain v. Larson (1934) 83 Utah
-t~O, :2~) P2d 355; Stanley v. Stanley (1939) 97 Utah 5~20,
94 P2d 465; Fin:;t Security Bank v. Burgi (1952) 122 Utah
445, :251 P2d 297.
Lucy's contention that the doctor's statement would
not be adlnissible in evidence is therefore erroneous.

Lucy argues that Y era should have proved her case
by circmnstantial evidence, and that she was therefore
not har1ned by Lucy's conceahnent of facts in violation
of her fiduciary duty of full disclosure. Declarations
by the transferor are a part of the circumstantial evidence. 1ll ower L JI ower, 64 1Ttah 260, 228 P 911, 914.
Furtherinore, Lucy would have to concede that a case
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by the S.J.an
Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided
by the Institute
of Museum of
and Library
outright
admission
by Dr.
Callister
his Services
without
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
fraudulent intent would be a weaker case than one based
upon such an admission. Vera was, therefore, hanned by
conceahnent of such statement because the weakness of a
case induces its settlement for a small mnount.
iLucy argues the admission of fraudulent intent by
the doctor was a privileged communication by one spouse
to another, but Lucy had no quahns about waiving the
"privilege" when it was to her advantage to disclose the
communication to the tax commision. She had the duty
to disclose the same statement to a creditor in the probate proceeding so long as she was executrix, and she
could only avoid such a duty by either declining to act
or by resigning as executrix, neither of which would she
do. It would be most peculiar to permit a fiduciary to
breach her duty of full disclosure and justify such breach
on the grounds that she had a personal privilege. More
importantly, communications between husband and wife
while engaged in the perpetration of a fraud are not
privileged. 58 .A.m. Jur. Witnesses, par. 398.
It is amazing to note that Lucy next asserts, "Lucy
presently contends, and has contended all along, that
the transfers weren't made with intent to defraud Vera."
(Appellant's brief, page 19). This is a remarkable statement in light of the assertion to the tax commission that
the doctor told her the transfers were made for the
purpose of placing the stock beyond the access of Vera;
which statement was submitted to the tax commission
for the purpose of establishing that the transfers were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Lucy next argues that a litigant generally has no
duty to disclose facts helpful to the opposition. This is
conceded, and the cases cited by Lucy on the point are
8otmd, but they are inapplicable because there is no
fiduciary relationship involved in those cited cases. Vera
concedes that if there were no fiduciary duty of full
disclosure, then failure to disclose would not be fraudulent, but Vera does not agree that it is either "preposterous'' or "unreasonable" that Vera should expect
a full diselosure from the executrix. Lucy had a duty
of full disclosure when Vera asserted her claim, which
duty continued after Lucy denied the claim and suit was
brought against her.
In discussing the duties of an administrator, Bancroft says:

"Once appointed and acting, the representative becon1es as to the heirs and devisees, a fiduciary, and practically a trustee in n1any respects,
subject to the burden of dealing with a fairness
which is the settled concomitant of such relationship, ...
"Thus the personal representative of a decedent occupies a dual position; he stands in a
fiduciary relationship to the creditors and heirs
of the deceased, and at the same time he has
obligations as an officer of the court which apSponsored by the S.J.
Quinney Law
Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
pointed
him.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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2 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd Ed. Pars. 332,
337.
"Crosby was also the administrator or rnanager of the estate in Utah. As administrator he
had the duty to make full disclosure of all rnatters
and information regarding the estate. It is not
unlike a partnership where one partner manages
the business. He must make full disclosure of his
acts and the state of the business and render a
correct accounting." In re Blodgett's Estate, 93
Utah 1, 70 P2d 742, 749.
Justice Cardozo in the case of Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545, 62 A.L.R. 1, quoted in 2
Scott on Trusts, p. 909, said:
"Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arm's length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,
is then the standard of behavior. As to this there
has developed a tradition that is unending and
inveterate. rncompromising rigidity has been the
attitudes of courts of equity when petitioned to
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions.
Only thus had the level of conduct for fiduciaries
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by
the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by
any judgment of this court."
In Burns v. Skogstad, 69 Idaho 227, 206 Pac. 2d
765, 769, in a case remarkably close to the case at bar,
the Court said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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" ..• it wa~ the duty of the executor in dealing
with t hP~P legatees to 1nake a full disclosure of
all n·lPvant fact~ and to treat them with utmost
franktw~~. :~ Bogart Tntsts and Trustees, Sec.
-1:93 and 5-1-1. ~ehP burden was upon the defendants
to show that this duty was performed. This the
defendants have not done. The record is silent as
to what disclosures, if any, 'vere 1nade by the
Pxecutor as to the condition, or value of the
P~tah·, or a~ to the interests of the legatees
therein.''

HUtnwst fairness and good faith is required of an
executor with those whom he purports to represent." 33
C.. J.S. 1102, Sec. 1-12, note 41. The executor primarily
represents the creditors of the estate of the decedent and
secondarily the heirs. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v.
Farmers & Lllechanics Bank, 173 F. 390; In re Weinberg's
Estate, :296 N.Y.S.7, 162 Misc. 867. A trust relation exists
between the executor and the creditors, especially if the
estate i::; insolvent. Reconstntction Finance Corp. v. Lee,
:!90 ~lich. 328, :287 N.W. 757.
It i::; alway::; held to be actual fraud for an executor

to take for his own benefit a position in which his personal intere::;t will conflict with his primary duty to
creditors. Sclzolz r. llazard, 68 Colo. 343, 191 Pac. 123;
:2 Bancroft's Probate Pt·actice 648, Sec. 339. fVoodson v.
Raynolds, -!:2 X .~l. 161, 76 P2d 3-1.
Lucy as executrLx had a legal duty to disclose to
Yera, a::-; a creditor, facts in Lucy's knowledge regarding
thebyassets
of Law
theLibrary.
estate
fraudulent
transfers
theServices
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decedent. The probate inventory filed by Lucy (R. 85)
and the inheritance tax inventory (R. 100) were half
truths. 2 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 657 Sec. 506,
states : "If property was conveyed by the decedent in his
lifetime in fraud of creditors and the assets are insufficient to pay his debts, such property may be recovered in
most states in an action by the representative and must
be inventoried although it is an 'asset' only for the payment of debts." (emphasis ours). Adams v. Prather, 176
Cal. 33, 167 P. 534.
In Baker v. Baker, 24 'Tenn. App. 220, 142 S.W. 2d
737, the court states :
"'The executor is bound to disclose material
facts within his knowledge wherein the beneficiary's interest is to be affected by a transaction
with the executor, concealment by the executor
being fraudulent in law and furnishing basis for
equitable relief."
S.ee 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jtttrisprudence, 8ec. 902.

In re Dryden's Estate, 155 Neb. 552, 52 N.W. 2d 734,
holds that " The personal representative of an estate and
his attorney are officers of the court and are fiduciaries
in their relation to the estate of the deceased and the
persons interested therein," and that failure of the executor and his attorney to disclose facts material to such
interested persons to protect their interests is extrinsic
fraud requiring equitable relief. This duty of disclosure
by an executor was again spelled out in Purinton v.
Dyson, 8 Cal. 2d 322, 65 P.2d 777, 113 A.L.R. 1230.
1
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failtuP to fully disclose was not only a breach
of Juty as a fiduciary. It was the 1neans of reaping a
benefit for Ltu·y pPrsonall~·. ~lw was an officer of the
<·ourt, who in tlw language of our court in Weyant v.
l"lali Sur . . ~. Tr. Co .. 5-I- Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.L.R.
1119, '"used the <·onrt as an instru1nent to gain her own
Pnd." /11 n· Sullirau·,..,. Estate, 51 Ariz. 483, 78 P.2d 132,
i~ a east> involving failure of an executor to disclose
material fads to <'reditors. The court said:
.. When a party who speaks falsely or refuses
to speak truly occupies a fiduciary relation toward an injured party so that it is his duty to
state all the facts, and if further he profits by
his own fraudulent conduct, the conduct will
justify equity in intervening even in a collateral
proceedings whether the fraud be considered extrinsic or intrinsic."
Lucy argues that there was no reliance. The test of
reliancL' in a case of conceahnent is whether or not Vera
would have adPd differently had there been a disclosure.
:>7 C.J.S. Froud, par. 29. Vera testified that although
she would have been guided by counsel, had the statement by Dr. Callister been disclosed to her, she would
not han• ~Pttled. (R-52-53) Furthermore, Vera's lawyer
said that he would not have advised settlement had the
statPment by Dr. Callister as to his fraudulent intent
been disclosed by Lucy. (R-52-26)
Lucy cites Cultuu r. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351, 23 P.16,
as authority as to when a fiduciary's duty of disclosure
terminates. That case holds that the fiduciary duty conhasn't
tinuesby thesoS.J.long
the relationship
continues.
Lucy
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yet resigned as executrix and still has the duty of full
disclosure. In none of the cases cited by Lucy is the
fiduciary exonerated from an original duty to disclose
by virtue of the fact that a suit is pending to establish
the very thing concealed.
Lucy asserts that this was an arm's-length transaction because Vera had counsel. Vera's counsel was
duped along with Vera. He would not have advised compromising Vera's claim had Lucy disclosed facts known
to her. (R-52-26)
'There was a fiduciary duty of accounting for assets
and of full disclosure and a breach of said duties, reliance
on which changed Vera's course of conduct.
POINT III.
LUCY'S FRAUD WAS EX'TRINSIC.

·The fraud is stated by Lucy to be intrinsic and not
the type which is the basis for setting aside a judgment
which must be extrinsic. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud has been criticized as being
largely a matter of semantics; but even if the distinction
is a valid one, where a fiduciary has a duty to make a
full and fair disclosure to the adverse party of relevant
and material facts, a failure to do so is extrinsic fraud
and is the basis for setting aside a judgment. 7 Moore's
Federal Practice, 60.37, footnote 22. Where testamentary
trustees had a duty to disclose to beneficiaries their
self dealing, the trustees' failure to disclose was held
to be both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud and an order
vacating a judgment was affirmed. Re Enger, 225 Minn.
229, 30 NW 2d 694, 1 ALR 2d 1048. An order setting
1
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a:-;idt· a judgment wa:-; held to be proper where a guardian
ohtuint•(l a rdPaHP and discharge frmn his wards. The
I'Oill't :-;aid, "If tlt~·n· wa~ fraud in obtaining the relt·a:-;t·, tlti:-; fraud was t•t•rtainly extrinsic to the judgHH·nt." l)u rk r. Park, 1~3 Fed 2d 370, 37~.
l1\11'th1·nnun•, if there is fraud upon the court as
lwn·. tltt· vPry language partially quoted by Lucy in
her ln·ipf from Hauer 'C. llauer, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P2d
~177, .->7S-~), ~how~ that the judgment should be set aside
a~ lwing t>xtrin:-;ic fraud. The court said:
"lt i~ smneti1nes said that when a judgment
is attacked collaterally on the ground that it was
obtained by fraud or deceit it will be set aside
onlv for extrinsic fraud. But we are in accord
with the indicators in the Restatement of J udgments that this is too limited. It seems more
reali~tie to ~a~~ that when it appears that the
proeP~~P~ of justice have been so completely
thwartPd or distorted as to persuade the court
that in fairness and good conscience a judg1nent
should not be permitted to stand, relief should
be granted. However, inasmuch as the plaintiff
here see1ns to be relying on the ground of fraud,
there is a di~tinction which it is necessary to
point out. ln order to justify granting relief,
the alleged wrong would have to be of the type
eharacterized as extrinsic fraud: that is, fraud
ba~ed on conduct or activities outside of the court
proceedings the1neslves ; and which is designed
and has the effect of depriving the other party of
the opportunity to present his claim or defense.
This type of fraud, which is regarded as a fraud
not only upon the opponent, but ttpon the court
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such as making false statements or representations to the other party or to witnesses to prevent
them from contesting the issues; or by that means
or otherwise preventing the attendance of the
parties or witnesses; or by destroying or secreting evidence; so that fair trial of the issues is
effectively prevented." (Emphasis ours).
The other cases cited by Lucy relating to extrinsic
and intrinsic fraud are not in point because they do not
involve a fiduciary's failure to disclose. Lucy seems to
concede this since she states that concealment is "not
a basis for setting aside the judgment unless the relationship between Vera and Lucy was such that there
was a special duty of disclosure.'' (Appellant's brief, 31).
Lucy had a special duty of disclosure in that she was
executrix.
POINT IV.
LUCY HAD A FIDUCIARY DUTY OF DISCLOSURE.

Lucy cites 75-11-14 UCA 1953 providing an executrix need not bring suit to recover property fraudulently
conveyed unless the creditor pays the costs of suit, but
Lucy concedes that the statute does not apply to this
situation, where the executrix herself is the one in possession of the property fraudulently transferred.
Lucy infers that because a creditor can directly sue
an executrix when she is a fraudulent transferee, there
is therefore a recognition of a conflict of interest, and
Lucy then concludes that "it would be unrealistic to
expect Lucy to protect Vera's claim." (Appellant's brief,
34). By this Lucy must mean that where there is a conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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t'lict of intPrl·;.;t, a fiduciary i~ relieved frmn any duty of
full di~elo~un·. Such i~ not the law and Lucy cites no
I'H~P~ whi<·h Hupport ::-;twh a proposition. The case of
f:mmous r. Barto11, 109 Cal. 662, 42 P 303, cited by her
HH'n~ly holds that where an executrix was the fraudulent
g-rant''''· it would be useless for a creditor to demand that
slll' ~UL' herself or furnish costs of such suit. (Parenthl'tieally Luey also cites this case as holding that statellll•nts by a d<'('l'HHPd husband 1nade after a conveyance
an· inadmissible. This holding was based on an 1849'
California statute. California no longer so holds. See
1\.l'li!J r. Bauk of America Nat. T. & Savings Association supra.)
Luey cmnplains that no effort was 1nade by Vera to
remove her as executrix. Her reasoning 1nust be that
\"era must assmne that Lucy will not properly discharge
her duties, including that of full disclosure. Lucy, not
\\•ra, knew that Dr. Callister had stated his fraudulent
intent. Only Luey knew that she was concealing information. \.era had no reason to petition to remove Lucy
since ~lw had no indication that Lucy was concealing
information until she learned of the affidavit Lucy filed
with the tax conuni~Hion. Surely, Lucy cannot seriously
contend that because \~era did not petition to remove
her from office on the ground that Lucy had a conflict
of inh•rt>~t. that such inaction protects Lucy from any
wrongdoing on her part "·hile Lucy held onto said office
dl':'pitl' her conflict of interest.
Luey cite~ Borge L·. Traaen, 158 Ore. 454, 75 P2d
93~), as
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creditor of the estate because she had not reduced her
claim to judgment and thus the executrix owed no fiduciary duty to her. 'The case does not so hold.
In the Borge case, a creditor of the deceased filed
no claim in probate, and after the administratrix, who
was the wife of the decedent, was discharged upon the
closing of the estate, the creditor brought suit against
her, claiming a transfer in fraud of creditors. A demurrer was sustained by the lower court and affirmed
on appeal. The court said that no claim had been filed
in the estate during the probate, and that because no
claim was filed, any claim which she might originally
have had was barred and that she was no longer a
creditor of the estate. There was no allegation that
there were any claims filed with the administratrix which
were not paid. The court said that the administratrix
did not commit fraud by not inventorying the transferred
property because it was not in fact a part of the estate
inasmuch as it was not needed to pay debts. The court
cited the Oregon statute providing that an administratrix should bring an action to recover property transferred in fraud of creditors when the assets of the estate
are insufficient to satisfy claims. Since the creditor had
not filed her claim, and since therefore the estate was
not insolvent, the administratrix had no duty to inventory the property. ·The obvious distinction between the
case at bar and the Oregon case, which Lucy ignores,
is that a claim was filed in our case.
The Oregon case also states that a direct action
cannot be taken against the transferee until a judgment
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has been obtained against the transferor thereby establi8hing that the transferor had an obligation to the
(·n·ditor, und, until then, an equitable lien cannot be
iuqHI~t·d on the transferred property. This 1nay have
bel•n tlu• rule in Oregon in 1938 as well as in some other
~tate~, but J5-l-15 l~CA 1953, provides, in part, as
follows:
":25-1-15. RIGl-lT8 OF CREDITORS WIT'H
.JlATURED CLAil\1:S. - Where a conveyance
or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such
creditor, when his clai1n has matured, may, as
again~t any person, except a purchaser for fair
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at
the tilne of the purchase or one who has derived
title inllllediately or 1nediately from such a purchaser:
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy
his clailu ; or,
( J) Di~regard the conveyance, and attach,
or levy execution upon, the property conveyed."

This statute requires no reduction to judgment, but
authorizes a direct re1nedy against the transferee. Our
l'H~l' does not involve any equitable lien in any event.
l'tah rules relating to a joinder of actions should also
do away with any requirement of prior judgment. Even
if a prior judgn1ent wt>re required, Vera does have a
judgment as to alinwny which is a determination that
the transferor had an obligation, which would satisfy
the rational of the Oregon rule, even though not further
reduced to a judgn1ent as to the amount actually due.
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Lucy's conclusion that there was no fiduciary relationship is therefore not substantiated.
Lucy argues that an executri.x has no duty of disclosure and cites In re Blodgett's Estate, 93 Utah 1, 70
P2d 742, as authority for the proposition. That case, in
the very language quoted by Lucy, holds that there is a
duty of disclosure by an executrix or administratrix
and that until there is a full disclosure there is a breach
of duty. The Court said there was no duty to advise, but
said:
" ... His duty as administrator went to the
obligation to take into possession and disclose
all estate property and all information to those
interested in the estate as to estate matters, thus
putting them on the same plane as he was as to
such information regarding all the assets and
transactions, but, when that is done, he has performed his duty to a party in regard to whom he
is in controversy as to their respective interest....
"All we need to do is to determine if there
were reasonable grounds for controversy and, if
so, whether he furnished her full information as
executor from which she could decide in their
controversy as beneficiaries what she would or
would not do. . . .
". . . The law is plain that he has his duty
as trustee to her and as such it must be fully performed."
The court then found there was full disclosure.
Our very point is that Lucy did fail to disclose,
not that there was any duty or failure to advise. The
Blodgett case does not even discuss the assertion by
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Luey that personal dislike hd ween the executrix and a
ht•net'iciary t•x<·<·tt~P~ the exP<·utrix fr01n her duty of full
<li~do~nre.

'rhe ea~t· of Jorgcu8('1/ r. Jorgen8en, 3~ Cal. 2d 13,
193 I,:2d 1:2S, 1:~:2, i~ cited by Lucy as authority for the
proposition that a fiduciary has no duty of full disclosure. ln that ea~P the husband asserted his legal conclusion in a divorce action that certain property was
his separate property, rather than cmmnunity property.
'fhere wa~ no failure on his part to disclose assets . .All
the court held wa8 that there was no fraud because there
was no conceahnent of facts, and the husband was entitled to assert his legal position without being guilty
of fraud, with which we agree. There was not even an
all('gation that facts concerning the separate or community property were known to the husband and not
known by the wife or that any such facts were concealed.
\Yhy Lucy cites this case we can't imagine, because the
court states the following law:
.. It is necessary to examine the facts in the
light of the policy that a party who failed to
assemble all his evidence at the trial should not
be privileged -to relitigate a case, as well as the
policy pennitting a party to seek relief from a
judg1nent entered in a proceeding in which he
was deprived of a fair opportunity fully to present his case.

"The latter policy applies when a party's adversary. in violation of a duty arising from a
trust or confidential relation, has concealed from
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even though such facts concerned issues involved
in the case in whieh the judgment was entered.
''The failure to perform the duty to speak or make
disclosures which rests upon one because of a
trust or confidential relation is obviously a fraud,
for which equity may relieve from a judgment
thereby obtained, even though the breach of duty
occurs during a judicial proceeding and involves
false testimony, and this is true whether such
fraud be regarded as extrinsic or as an exception
to the extrinsic fraud rule.' (Citing authority) In
this state equitable relief has been granted from
final judgments settling the accounts of guardians, administrators, or executors who withheld
information that would have enabled the beneficiaries to attack the accounts. (Citing authority)
The same principle applies to decrees distributing the estate of a decedent adversely to the rights
of beneficiaries who have been precluded from
pursuing their rights by concealment of facts by
the fiduciary. (Citing authority)"
Lucy contends that if Lucy had not been executrix
and another executrix had sued her to recover the property fraudulently conveyed, she would have had no
fiduciary duty of disclosure. We see no relevancy to
such argument because she did assume the duties of
an executrix and must discharge them.
POINT V.
THERE WERE NO TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT.

Lucy argues that there was a triable issue of fact
as to reliance. Where a false representation has been
made, which, from its nature, might induce another
to act, there is a presumption that there was a reliance
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on thP n·presentation. ~-!- Am. J ur. :.B-,raud and Deceit,
Par. ~fi-t. Not only was there this presu1nption, but
th•·n· WPl'P tl~t· dP1wsitions of both Vera and her counsel
wlwrPiu \~Pra testified that she would not have settled
had Luey told her of the stateinent by Dr. Callister of
hi~ fraudulent intent (R-52-53), and Vera's counsel testifit•d that he would not have advised settlement had he
known of tht• statmnent (R-52-26). Furthermore, there
wu~ not only a conceahnent by the fiduciary but also an
t>xprP~~ denial of Dr. Callister's intent when Lucy knew
thP doctor had divulged a fraudulent intent (R-28). Had
there been no such denial there would have been no
comprolllise.
Luey also argues that there was an issue as to
whether or not the state1nent by Dr. Callister was material. lt wa~ the key to the whole question of his intent.
Luey argues that she had no intention to mislead.
This is inconceivable.
Lucy next presents the ingenious argument that
Yera may be estopped because she did not instantly bring
::;nit, but pern1itted Lucy to continue to assert to the tax
t'Ollnnission that Dr. Callister had an intent to defraud
creditors. Lucy does not point out what detriment she
conet>ivably could have suffered nor what misrepres~nta
tion Vera made which could be the basis of estoppel.
Lucy contends that the timeliness of an action to
::'L't aside a judg1nent is a matter of fact which a Court
on a bymotion
for
SUllllnary
judgment
not
decide.
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Although admittedly the timeliness of bringing an action
may involve questions of fact as well as law, when
there is no genuine issue as to the facts involved, as
here, then a Court on a motion for summary judgment
should decide the question. There is no genuine issue
as to the length of time involved in filing the suit after
discovery of the fraud, nor as to possibility of prejudice
to Lucy as a result of any delay, nor as to actual injury
because of delay, nor as to rights of third parties, all
of which are the "issues of fact" affecting the right to
rescind, according to the authority cited by Lucy. Brown
v. Hassens, 212 Ore. 246, 319 P2d 929. Judge Ellett
properly ruled that there was no genuine issue of fact,
which ruling must have been based upon the pleadings,
the depositions and statement of counsel. A trial court
would be considering no facts other than those before
Judge Ellett.
A comparable time for rescision of 3 months was
recently held timely by this count in Elder v. Clawson,
....... Utah ......, 384 P2d 802.
Lucy argues that Vera has unclean hands, because
her counsel, pursuant to the pretrial court's suggestion,
pointed out to Lucy's counsel inheritance tax savings
that would result if it were conceded that Dr. Callister
had an intent to defraud creditors, which would rebutt
an intent to make a gift in contemplation of death. There
was no "invitation" to do anything. Vera's suggestion
was only pointing out the benefits to the estate tax wise,
and hence to Lucy personally, of the recognition of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
Yt·ra's clain1 (R-52-12). It was Lucy, not Vera, who was
carrying water on both shoulders. Evidence of the doctor'H irltt•nt was available to Lucy, not Vera.
POINT VI.
A NEW ACTION IS NOT NECESSARY.

Rule 60(b) URCP clearly authorizes that a judgment be set aside either by motion or by independent
action.
CONCLUSION
Despite Lucy's efforts to make it appear that she,
the executrix, had not sinned but, in fact, had been sinned
against, this is simply a case in which there was sharp
practice by an executrix to her own financial advantage,
which Judge Ellett said he would not allow, because
officers of the court are expected to uphold the dignity
and honor of the cou.rt. We submit that he should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES W. BELESS, JR., and
BRAYTON, LO\VE & HURLEY
JOHN W. LOWE.
1001 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for plaintiff
and respondent.
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